Behavior-based price discrimination and customer information sharing

Abstract : This article investigates the incentives and the effects of information sharing among rival firms about the identities of their past customers in a two-period model with behaviorbased price discrimination (BBPD). An unilateral information exchange between the two periods takes place in a subgame-perfect equilibrium. This exchange increases the ability of the industry to price discriminate consumers according to their profiles and boosts the profitability of BBPD at the expense of consumers.
Document type :
Preprints, Working Papers, ...
Complete list of metadatas

Cited literature [22 references]  Display  Hide  Download

https://hal-polytechnique.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01226250
Contributor : Mariame Seydi <>
Submitted on : Monday, November 9, 2015 - 10:49:44 AM
Last modification on : Wednesday, January 23, 2019 - 10:29:31 AM
Long-term archiving on : Wednesday, February 10, 2016 - 10:16:46 AM

File

Cahier de recherhce n° 2015-1...
Files produced by the author(s)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01226250, version 1

Collections

Citation

Romain de Nijs. Behavior-based price discrimination and customer information sharing. 2015. ⟨hal-01226250⟩

Share

Metrics

Record views

719

Files downloads

1444