On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard

Pierre Martinon 1 Pierre Picard 2 Anasuya Raj 2
1 Commands - Control, Optimization, Models, Methods and Applications for Nonlinear Dynamical Systems
UMA - Unité de Mathématiques Appliquées, Inria Saclay - Ile de France, CMAP - Centre de Mathématiques Appliquées - Ecole Polytechnique
Abstract : We analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral hazard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and policyholders decide on their health expenditures. We characterize the trade-o§ between ex ante risk sharing and ex post incentive compatibility, in an optimal revelation mechanism under hidden information and risk aversion. We establish that the optimal contract provides partial insurance at the margin, with a deductible when insurersí rates are a§ected by a positive loading, and that it may also include an upper limit on coverage. We show that the potential to audit the health state leads to an upper limit on out-of-pocket expenses.
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Submitted on : Monday, July 25, 2016 - 11:02:29 AM
Last modification on : Monday, September 30, 2019 - 10:46:02 AM
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Cahier n° 2016-09_MARTINON-PI...
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  • HAL Id : hal-01348551, version 1


Pierre Martinon, Pierre Picard, Anasuya Raj. On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard. 2016. ⟨hal-01348551v1⟩



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