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Article Dans Une Revue Geneva Risk and Insurance Review Année : 2018

On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard

Résumé

We analyze the design of optimal medical insurance under ex post moral haz- ard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and policyholders decide for themselves on their health expenditures. The trade-o¤ between ex ante risk sharing and ex post incentive compatibility is analyzed in an optimal revelation mechanism under hidden information and risk aversion. The optimal contract provides partial insurance at the margin, with a deductible when in- surers’ rates are affected by a positive loading, and it may also include an upper limit on coverage. The potential to audit the health state leads to an upper limit on out-of-pocket expenses.
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Dates et versions

hal-01348551 , version 1 (25-07-2016)
hal-01348551 , version 2 (22-12-2017)
hal-01348551 , version 3 (12-06-2018)

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  • HAL Id : hal-01348551 , version 2

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Pierre Martinon, Pierre Picard, Anasuya Raj. On the Design of Optimal Health Insurance Contracts under Ex Post Moral Hazard. Geneva Risk and Insurance Review, In press. ⟨hal-01348551v2⟩
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