A note on health insurance under ex post moral hazard - Archive ouverte HAL Access content directly
Preprints, Working Papers, ... Year :

A note on health insurance under ex post moral hazard

(1)
1
Pierre Picard
  • Function : Author
  • PersonId : 971407

Abstract

In the linear coinsurance problem, examined first by Mossin (1968), a higher risk aversion with respect to wealth in the sense of Arrow-Pratt implies a higher optimal coinsurance rate. We show that this property does not hold for health insurance under ex post moral hazard, i.e., when illness severity cannot be observed by insurers and policyholders decide on their health expenditures. The optimal coinsurance rate trades off a risk sharing effect and an incentive effect, both related to risk aversion.
Fichier principal
Vignette du fichier
Cahier n° 2016-17_PICARD.pdf (266.6 Ko) Télécharger le fichier
Origin : Files produced by the author(s)
Loading...

Dates and versions

hal-01385520 , version 1 (21-10-2016)

Identifiers

  • HAL Id : hal-01385520 , version 1

Cite

Pierre Picard. A note on health insurance under ex post moral hazard . 2016. ⟨hal-01385520⟩
172 View
237 Download

Share

Gmail Facebook Twitter LinkedIn More