Defense against DoS and load altering attacks via model-free control: A proposal for a new cybersecurity setting

Michel Fliess (1, 2) , Cédric Join (3, 2) , Dominique Sauter (3)

1 LIX - Laboratoire d'informatique de l'École polytechnique [Palaiseau]
2 AL.I.E.N. - ALgèbre pour Identification & Estimation Numériques
3 CRAN - Centre de Recherche en Automatique de Nancy

Defense against cyberattacks is an emerging topic related to fault-tolerant control. In order to avoid difficult mathematical modeling, model-free control (MFC) is suggested as an alternative to classical control. For illustration purpose a Load Frequency Control of multi-areas power network is considered. In the simulations, load altering attacks and Denial of Service (DoS) in the communication network are applied to the system. Our aim is to compare the impact of cyberattacks on control loops closed via respectively a classical controller in such situations and a model-free one. Computer experiments show impressive results with MFC.

Keywords: cyberattacks; load altering attacks; Denial of Service; fault-tolerant control; actuator's fault accommodation; packet loss; power grid; load frequency control; model-free control

Domains: Automatic; Systems and Control [cs.SY]; Networking and Internet Architecture [cs.NI]; Optimization and Control [math.OC]

Michel Fliess, Cédric Join, Dominique Sauter. Defense against DoS and load altering attacks via model-free control: A proposal for a new cybersecurity setting. 5th International Conference on Control and Fault-Tolerant Systems, SysTol'21, Sep 2021, Saint-Raphaël, France. ⟨10.1109/SysTol52990.2021.9595717⟩. ⟨hal-03283292⟩